Positioning in marketing

Origin

Jack Trout published the first article to use the term in June 1969, in Industrial Marketing, under the title “‘Positioning’ is a game people play in today’s me-too market place” [1]. Its argument: a company can spend millions on great advertising and still fail if it ignores what already sits in the buyer’s head [1]. Three years later Trout and Al Ries wrote the three-part series “The Positioning Era Cometh” for Advertising Age (24 April, 1 May and 8 May 1972) [2]; the book, Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind, followed from McGraw-Hill in 1981 [3].

The 1972 text names the problem: the creative party of the 1960s was over and “the wreckage is still washing up on the beach” (Corfam, Gablinger’s beer, Look magazine) [2]. Their answer, in their own words: the new era “stresses the need to create a ‘position’ in the prospect’s mind” [2].

They were not alone. The same series quotes an Ogilvy advertisement of the period: “The results of your campaign depend less on how we write your advertising than on how your product is positioned” [2]. Ries and Trout gave the idea a theory: the overcommunicated society, the ladder in the mind, positioning against the leader as Avis did [1][2].

Two things to hold onto. It is a theory of communication, not of product: the 1969 article says the competitor’s image “is just as important as your own. Sometimes more important” [1]. And it came from agency casework, not from a dataset. The textbook version is broader. Kotler and Keller made positioning the third step of segmentation, targeting and positioning, with a chapter titled “Crafting the Brand Positioning” [4]. Aaker folded it into brand identity, as the part that is actively communicated [5]. Keller, Sternthal and Tybout added the frame of reference, points of parity and points of difference [6][7].

What the evidence shows

Here is the awkward part. Positioning as Ries and Trout wrote it has never been tested as a proposition. It is a theorist’s claim built on cases: Avis, and 7-Up’s Un-Cola, which the 1972 series says lifted sales “something like 10%” in its first year [2]. There is no controlled study we can cite that shows brands with a sharper position grow faster.

What has been tested is the claim underneath it: that buyers hold a perceived, valued difference in mind and buy because of it. The best direct test is Romaniuk, Sharp and Ehrenberg (2007) [8]. Method: telephone surveys in seven Australian categories (skincare, spirits, cars, beer, fast food, banking, supermarkets), with “different” and “unique” hidden at random among other attributes, plus Young & Rubicam Brand Asset Valuator data from ten UK categories collected in 1999 [8]. Only current users of each brand were counted.

Headline finding: across all 17 markets, an average of 11% of a brand’s own users said it was different, 10% said it was unique, and 17% said either [8, Table 2]. Spirits and skincare, chosen for being image-led and heavily advertised, scored highest at 36% and 30%.

Spirits (Aus)36%

Supermarkets (Aus)31%

Skincare (Aus)30%

Ice cream (UK)20%

Fast food (Aus)20%

Banking (Aus)18%

Condiments (UK)17%

Soft drinks (UK)16%

Fruit and veg drinks (UK)16%

Ready sauces (UK)14%

Computers (UK)14%

Soups (UK)12%

Yoghurt (UK)11%

Cars (Aus)11%

Cars (UK)11%

Water (UK)10%

Electronics (UK)8%

Average, 17 markets17%

Even in spirits and skincare, the two categories chosen for being the most image-driven, fewer than four in ten users see their own brand as different or unique.

Source: Romaniuk, Sharp and Ehrenberg, Evidence concerning the importance of perceived brand differentiation, 2007, n= per category in Appendix 1, Table 2. Redrawn by Brave New Media.

Unit: % of current brand users

Show the data

Item	% of current brand users
Spirits (Aus)	36
Supermarkets (Aus)	31
Skincare (Aus)	30
Ice cream (UK)	20
Fast food (Aus)	20
Banking (Aus)	18
Condiments (UK)	17
Soft drinks (UK)	16
Fruit and veg drinks (UK)	16
Ready sauces (UK)	14
Computers (UK)	14
Soups (UK)	12
Yoghurt (UK)	11
Cars (Aus)	11
Cars (UK)	11
Water (UK)	10
Electronics (UK)	8
Average, 17 markets	17

Two checks matter. Respondents were not apathetic: 54% named at least one brand in the category as different or unique, and 76% did so in soft drinks, while only 19% of Coca-Cola’s users said it of Coca-Cola [8]. And brands with an obvious functional difference did score. Aldi, which does not stock national brands, got 67% for different from its own shoppers; Subway got 50% for unique against burger, pizza and chicken rivals [8]. Buyers can see difference when it is large. They mostly do not see it.

Business buyers are no sharper. A Gartner survey of more than 1,100 B2B customers in December 2020 found that 64% could not tell one B2B brand’s digital experience from another’s, and 76% did nothing different after engaging suppliers through websites, tools and content [16].

Cannot tell one B2B brand's digital experience from another's64%

Did nothing different after engaging suppliers digitally76%

Ehrenberg-Bass measured consumers. Gartner measured business buyers reading websites, tools and content, and found the same blindness: most could not see a difference and most did nothing about what they saw.

Source: Gartner, press release "Gartner Says B2B Sales Organizations Need to Give Customers a Seller-Assisted Digital Buying Experience", 17 May 2021, n=more than 1,100 B2B customers surveyed December 2020. Redrawn by Brave New Media.

Unit: % of surveyed B2B customers

Show the data

Item	% of surveyed B2B customers
Cannot tell one B2B brand's digital experience from another's	64
Did nothing different after engaging suppliers digitally	76

Apple is the authors’ test case. In 1999, with coloured iMacs against beige boxes and its own operating system, 23% of Apple users called it different or unique. 77% did not [8, Table 5].

A second, older finding sits underneath this one. Bird, Channon and Ehrenberg (1970) showed that the share of people who attach an image attribute to a brand depends on how recently they used it [10]. Romaniuk, Bogomolova and Dall’Olmo Riley re-tested it in 2012 across new categories, countries and online data, and found the generalisation “still holds, both qualitatively and, to a large extent, quantitatively” [11]. The 2007 differentiation data show the same shape: users were roughly twice as likely as non-users to call a brand different [8, Table 4].

This is why an image tracker will always tell a big brand it is well positioned. Usage produces image responses, almost regardless of the attribute.

The third body of evidence is about what advertising does when it works. Binet and Field’s analyses of the IPA Databank (880 cases in 2007 [12], 996 cases in 2013 [13]) find that campaigns which build fame, meaning the brand gets talked about, convert share of voice into growth most efficiently. On IPA cases from 2004 to 2016, rational campaigns returned a share-of-voice efficiency of 0.2, emotional campaigns 1.0, fame campaigns 1.3 [14]. Their reading of positioning’s job matches Ehrenberg-Bass’s: get the brand into more heads, rather than argue the point of difference to a few.

Rational0.2

Emotional1.0

Fame1.3

The IPA cases reward campaigns that get the brand talked about over campaigns that argue its point of difference, which is the same direction the Ehrenberg-Bass differentiation data point.

Source: IPA, Binet and Field, Marketing Effectiveness in the Digital Era, 2017, IPA Databank cases 2004 to 2016. Redrawn by Brave New Media.

Unit: share-of-voice efficiency index

Show the data

Item	share-of-voice efficiency index
Rational	0.2
Emotional	1.0
Fame	1.3

The challenge

The strongest published critique comes from the same 2007 paper. Romaniuk, Sharp and Ehrenberg conclude that “marketers do not need to convince buyers that the brand is different in order to get them to buy” and that “such a task is probably near impossible” [8]. They put distinctiveness in differentiation’s place: unique brand associations (colour, logo, tagline, character, advertising style) whose only job is to make the brand easy to notice and identify. The criteria are uniqueness and prevalence: linked to one brand only, and known to most buyers [8]. Sharp’s How Brands Grow (2010) put it more bluntly: “Rather than striving for meaningful, perceived differentiation, marketers should seek meaningless distinctiveness. Branding lasts, differentiation doesn’t” [9].

Read carefully, the two camps disagree less than the slogans suggest.

Where they agree: the contest happens in memory, not in the product. Ries and Trout said so in 1972 [2]; Romaniuk and colleagues say distinctive elements “create, refresh or reinforce consumer memory structures” [8]. Both insist the position, or the asset, must belong to one brand only. Both prize consistency over decades; the 2007 paper’s example is the Nike swoosh, shown beside the name for years before it could stand alone [8].

Where they disagree: whether the thing in memory has to be a valued difference. Ries and Trout’s position is a reason to prefer: Avis over Hertz, Un-Cola over cola. Ehrenberg-Bass says the memory structure need carry no meaning at all. It is a handle for retrieval, and buyers who cannot name anything different about the brand buy it regardless [8].

Kantar’s own data lands between the camps. Its Blueprint for Brand Growth, built on 6.5 billion data points across 21,000 brands, decomposes demand into three drivers: salience explains 42%, meaning 38%, difference 20%. The same deck puts perceived relative difference at 50% of what justifies a brand’s price [17]. Difference does little to get a brand bought and a great deal to get it paid for.

Salient42%

Meaningful38%

Different20%

Kantar sells the case for difference and its own decomposition still puts it last of the three drivers of demand. Where difference earns its keep is price: the same deck says perceived relative difference accounts for 50% of what justifies a brand's price.

Source: Kantar, The Blueprint for Brand Growth, MASB presentation, 2025, 6.5 billion data points on 21,000 brands in 540 categories and 54 markets, slide 5. Redrawn by Brave New Media.

Unit: % of Demand Power explained

Show the data

Item	% of Demand Power explained
Salient	42
Meaningful	38
Different	20

Where it is contested: Keller’s camp holds that points of difference still matter once points of parity are met, and warns that “points of differentiation alone are not enough to sustain a brand against competitors” [6]. The 2007 paper cites that warning with approval [8]. The open question is whether the exceptions (Aldi, Subway and the small premium brands that scored higher [8]) show that real functional difference pays, or only that buyers can report a difference when it is large. Romaniuk and colleagues write that their data “does not totally negate” a causal link between perceived differentiation and performance, only that any gain looks temporary or quickly matched [8].

Ask buyers directly and the parity list is long. In Edelman’s 2025 survey of 15,042 people in 15 countries, 88% called best quality, good value and “I trust it” important or a deal breaker for the brands they buy, and the next five attributes sat within eight points of them [18].

Offers the best quality88%

Good value for the money88%

I trust it88%

High quality customer service85%

Has a good reputation85%

Convenient to find, buy and use84%

I love it82%

I trust the company that owns the brand80%

Quality, value and trust tie at the top and the next five sit within eight points of them. Every attribute here is a point of parity in Keller's terms, so a position that claims any one of them claims nothing the buyer does not already expect of every brand.

Source: Edelman, 2025 Edelman Trust Barometer Special Report: Brand Trust, From We to Me, 2025, n=15,042 in 15 countries, page 13. Redrawn by Brave New Media.

Unit: % of respondents

Show the data

Item	% of respondents
Offers the best quality	88
Good value for the money	88
I trust it	88
High quality customer service	85
Has a good reputation	85
Convenient to find, buy and use	84
I love it	82
I trust the company that owns the brand	80

Cialdini did not address positioning by name. The nearest mechanism in Influence is the contrast principle in chapter 1: a second item is judged against the first, which is why an estate agent shows a run-down “setup” house before the real one [15]. It explains why “We’re only No. 2” works as a claim: it borrows the leader’s size as the contrast. It says nothing about owning a word, and we will not stretch it.

Where practitioners get it wrong

The positioning statement that never leaves the deck. It is written once, approved, and then handed to a campaign with a new look every year. The 2007 paper’s complaint is exactly this: consistency of message gets discussed, consistency of “the visual, verbal or style of branding elements” does not, and “most of the attention from marketers is on aspects that are new and fresh” [8]. The buyer never sees the position. They see six unconnected campaigns.

Reading the perceptual map as proof. Mapping techniques “highlight small differences, almost regardless of magnitude” [8]. Because usage drives image responses [10][11], the map mostly shows who has more users. A big brand looks well positioned on every axis. A small brand looks lost. Neither reading tells you what to say.

Manufacturing a difference the category cannot see. If your direct measure of “different” sits near the category norm of about 17% [8], and there is no Aldi-sized functional fact behind the claim, spend will move that number very little. The money does more work on reach, fame and a recognisable asset [8][14].

Our own observation. For a national membership platform for specialist physicians practising outside insurance, the temptation was a fresh angle every week; the subject is rich enough for it. We locked the assets instead: one belief line, one rhetorical device, one shape of invitation, the founders’ actual faces, the same visual codes everywhere. Adopters then grew around 50% a month for three consecutive months with no paid acquisition behind it. The rate flatters a small base and will come down. The point holds: repetition built the memory, and the position never moved.

What to do with it

1. Write the position in three lines: the frame of reference, the points of parity you must match, and one point of difference [6]. If any line is blank, the document is not finished.
2. Test the difference before spending on it. Ask current buyers, in a pick-any survey with “different” and “unique” buried among other attributes, whether the brand is either. Compare the result with the 17% average across 17 markets [8]. At or below that norm, stop trying to move it.
3. Pick two or three distinctive assets (a colour, a shape, a phrase, a character) and measure each with buyers on uniqueness and prevalence [8]. If fewer than half of your buyers link the asset to you alone, it is not yet an asset.
4. Freeze those assets for five years. Judge every new campaign on one question: would someone who saw the last one know this is the same brand?
5. Split every image tracker by usage before reading it [10][11]. Never present an all-respondent image score as evidence of position.
6. Put the budget behind reach and fame, not persuasion of the difference. Fame campaigns converted share of voice to growth at 1.3 against 0.2 for rational ones [14]. Keep share of voice at or above share of market [13].
7. Position against the leader only when the contrast is true and checkable. Avis was second and said so [1]. If your claim depends on the buyer not knowing who leads, it is comparative advertising, not a position.